Phosphorus Frege introduced the notion of "sense" German: Sinn to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. First, if the entire significance of a sentence consists of its truth value, it follows that the sentence will have the same significance if we replace a word of the sentence with one having an identical reference, as this will not change its truth value.
Where proper names are concerned, both Frege and Russell are often described together as "descriptivists. According to Mill, "a proper name is but an unmeaning mark which Frege and russell connect in our minds with the idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of that individual object" The function of proper names, Mill thought, is not to convey general information but rather "to enable individuals to be made the subject of discourse;" names are "attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on any attribute of the object" All this is possible if using a name in thinking of or referring to an object is not a matter of representing it as having certain properties but, as Russell said, "merely to indicate what we are speaking about; [the name] is no part of the fact Frege and russell An obvious problem with this simple view is that if the role of names were simply to refer to their bearers, names without bearers would be meaningless.
Yet names without bearers seem perfectly meaningful and sentences in which they occur seem to express propositions. Descriptivism is often referred to as the "Frege-Russell view.
He held that ordinary proper names are really "abbreviated" or "disguised" definite descriptions. That is, the proposition expressed by a sentence in which a description occurs is the same whether the description has a denotation or not. So its denotation does not enter into that proposition.
Russell makes allowances for the fact that the requisite description will vary for different people, or for the same person at different times the description in our minds will probably be some more or less vague mass of historical knowledge far more, in most cases, than is required to identify himbut so long as the object to which the name applies remains constant, the particular description involved usually makes no difference to the truth or falsehood of the proposition in which the name appears.
That is, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we could, to make the judgment which Bismarck alone can make, namely, the judgment of which he himself is a constituent.
What enables us to communicate in spite of the varying descriptions we employ is that we know there is a true proposition concerning the actual Bismarck and that, however we may vary the description as long as the description is correctthe proposition described is still the same.
This proposition, which is described and is known to be true, is what interests us; but we are not acquainted with the proposition itself, and do not know it, though we know it is true.
But this general proposition does not itself involve Bismarck, and would be thinkable even if Bismarck never existed. Frege is a descriptivist of a different sort than Russell. He claims not that proper names are disguised descriptions but that they have senses as well as references.
The sense of a name is both the mode of presentation and the determinant of its referent it also functions for Frege as the "indirect" as opposed to "customary" reference when the name is embedded in a context of indirect quotation or propositional attitude ascription.
Frege agrees with Russell, and with Mill for that matter, that words are ordinarily used to talk about things, not ideas: Even so, in so using them we must associate reference-determining properties with our words. Moreover, insofar as our words also express our thoughts, they must correspond to constituents of those thoughts.
Thus, for Frege, the semantic and the cognitive significance of expressions are intimately related. Indeed, because an expression can have a sense without having a reference, Frege holds that the constituents of thoughts are senses, not references. Unlike Russell, he does not assimilate definite descriptions to quantificational phrases but treats them, like proper names properly so-calledas semantic units capable of having individuals as semantic values, determined by their senses.
The sense of such an expression plays the semantic role of imposing a condition that an individual must satisfy in order to be the referent.
A proper name, like a definite description, contributes its sense to that of a sentence in which it occurs regardless of which individual actually is its referent and even if it has no referent at all.
This is because the condition imposed by sense, the determinant of reference, is independent of that which it determines.
The same object can be presented in different ways, under different modes of presentation, but it is not essential to any mode of presentation that it actually present anything at all. His conception of sense leaves open the possibility of non-descriptive senses, such as percepts. He does not explicitly make the analogous point in regard to proper names, but nowhere does he explicitly assert that each proper name is equivalent to some definite description, and his overall theory of sense and reference does not require this equivalence.
For Russell, any object that can be presented at all cannot be presented in different ways. He avoids having to appeal to senses to solve them. Constituents of propositions are individuals particulars and universalsand the Principle of Acquaintance requires that "every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted" For Frege modes of presentation are the constituents of thoughts, and the objects which modes of presentation present are not.
Because the relation between subject to object is mediated by a sense, this relation is indirect, unlike Russellian acquaintance. They are, in their respective ways, descriptivists about singular thought as well as about proper names.
Russell held that ordinary proper names are abbreviated definite descriptions, but he denied that definite descriptions or expressions of any other sort have two levels of semantic significance.
This was the central point of "On Denoting" Deonauth 1 Shanesha Deonauth Sui Xin Selected Readings in Linguistics Denotation: Frege and Russell Lauded as the founders of language philosophy in the field of Linguistics, Frege’s article On Denoting and Russell’s on Sense and Reference, have been reviewed, commented upon and critiqued by numerous scholars within the .
Full archive of her photos and videos from ICLOUD LEAKS Here. Here are the latest sexy Lisa Del Piero pictures. Lisa here (no relation to Alessandro) is one of the most famous Instagram “celebrities”. Born in Wismar, where his father was Headmaster of a girls' school, Gottlob Frege was educated at the Universities of Jena and Göttingen, studying mathematics, natural sciences, and philosophy.
Gottlob Frege, (born November 8, , Wismar, Mecklenburg-Schwerin—died July 26, , Bad Kleinen, Germany), German mathematician and logician, who founded modern mathematical logic.
Working on the borderline between philosophy and mathematics—viz., in the . Comparing Frege and Russell. KENT BACH. Frege's and Russell's views are obviously different, but because of certain superficial similarities in how they handle certain famous puzzles about proper names, they are often assimilated.
Frege requires sense data to refer back to an object in the world, and Russell requires the acquaintance with sense data in order to acquire knowledge by description of an object in the world.
Both theories of cognitive access to the world are dependent on sense data, and therefore are similar.